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Approval Voting: The Case of the 1968 Election* 
D. Roderick Kiewiet, Yale University 
I. Introduction 
For most of this nation's history, electoral democracy has consisted 
mainly of competition between the candidates of two major national par- 
ties. Thus in most elections for national office the present method of 
categorical voting, that is, voters vote for one candidate only, has served 
adequately. Except for the electoral college, this method satisfies a sim- 
ple democratic criterion-the winner is preferred to the loser by a simple 
majority of the voters. 
However, when more than two candidates are running, there is no 
simple democratic criterion for selecting the winner. The plurality winner 
may fall far short of a majority, especially as the number of candidates 
increases. Furthermore, the plurality winner, that is, the candidate pre- 
ferred by the largest number of voters, may be least preferred by even 
more voters. A number of alternative methods of voting exist, which rely 
upon different criteria for selecting a winner.' Probably the most com- 
pelling principle, normatively and logically, for selecting a winner is the 
Condorcet criterion.2 This criterion requires that the winner be the can- 
didate who would defeat all other candidates in pairwise contests against 
them, provided that such a majority candidate xists. For example, if 
there are three candidates, A, B, and C, A is the Condorcet winner if A 
defeats B and C in separate, pairwise contests. Of course, if there are 
many candidates, uch a series of pairwise contests becomes impractical. 
While the Condorcet criterion was first proposed in 1785, students of 
politics have been slow in developing voting methods that satisfy it con- 
sistently and efficiently. However, recently Brams and Fishburn have 
* I would like to thank Steven J. Brams, C. Anthony Broh, Robert Hoyer, and 
an anonymous reviewer for their helpful advice and criticism. 
1. For a detailed discussion of voting methods and criteria for winning see 
Duncan Black, The Theory of Committees and Elections (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1958). 
2. Marquis de Condorcet, Essai sur l'application de l'analyse a la probabilite 
des decisions rendues d la pluralite des voix (Paris, 1785). Modern democratic 
theorists who favor the Condorcet criterion include Black, The Theory of Com- 
mittees and Elections; and Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1956), p. 43. 
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shown one method, which they call "approval voting," to be superior in 
this regard to a number of others.3 According to this method voters cast 
one vote each for as many candidates as they wish, but do not cast more 
than one vote for any one candidate. The candidate receiving the most 
votes wins. Unlike the present "one vote only" method, approval voting 
allows voters to express a choice (yes or no, approve or disapprove) for 
every candidate in the election. At the same time, approval voting is sim- 
pler than the Borda and similar methods in that voters do not need to 
rank their preferences. 
Brams and Fishburn also show that approval voting, besides reflecting 
voters' preferences more accurately than plurality voting and several 
other alternatives, is much more "strategy-proof." I , under plurality 
voting, the candidate most preferred by some voters has no chance of 
winning, voters are impelled to vote "'sophisticatedly" instead of "sin- 
cerely," that is, to vote for a less preferred candidate who has a good 
chance of winning in order to oppose a more objectionable candidate. 
Otherwise, voters, finding all the viable candidates distasteful, may not 
vote at all. Under approval voting, however, voters could vote for both 
their sincere and their strategic choices and thus avoid "wasting" their 
vote. 'By allowing voters a way out of this dilemma, approval voting, 
Brams and Fishburn feel, would encourage a higher voter turnout. 
Brams and Fishburn have described the mathematical properties of 
approval voting elsewhere in considerable detail.4 It is my purpose here 
to use data on voting behavior and the distribution fcandidate prefer- 
ences to gauge how this system would operate in the American political 
environment. The data are taken from the SRC-CPS National Election 
Study of 1968.5 In 1968 George Wallace challenged the two regular 
party nominees. Under the auspices of the American Independent Party 
he won 13.5 percent of the popular vote and 46 electoral votes. Nixon's 
narrow majority of the electoral vote rested on a slim popular plural- 
3. Steven J. Brams, "One Man, N Votes," (Mimeo), Module in Applied Mathe- 
matics, (Mathematical Association of America, 1976); Steven J. Brams and Peter 
C. Fishburn, "Approval Voting" (Paper presented at the 1977 Annual Meeting of 
the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1-4, 
1977); Steven J. Brams and Peter C. Fishburn, "Approval Voting," American 
Political Science Review 72 (1978): 831-847. 
4. Ibid. 
5. The data were collected by the Political Behavior Program of the Survey 
Research Center, Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan. 
Neither the original collectors of the data nor the Inter-University Consortium for 
Political Research, which made these data available, bears any responsibility for 
the interpretations presented here. 
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ity (43.4 percent to Humphrey's 42.7 percent), as well as slim plurali- 
ties in a number of states. 
More specifically, I will attempt to answer the following questions: 
1. To what extent was Wallace disadvantaged by the present 
"one vote only" method? 
2. Was Nixon the Condorcet winner? 
3. What would have been the outcome if the election had been 
held under approval voting? 
4. What general consequences for presidential elections and the 
party system might approval voting have if it were to replace the 
present method of voting? 
II. The Wallace Vote 
The inclination of voters to vote for a less preferred candidate with a 
reasonable chance of winning may have hurt Wallace's candidacy, as 
many of his supporters may have voted for their second choice. In fact, 
the Gallup Poll shows that Wallace's support dropped precipitously dur- 
ing the last month of the campaign-from 21 percent to 13 percent. The 
concern that a vote for Wallace would be wasted may have damaged 
his candidacy in still another way: knowing that Wallace could not win, 
and unwilling to vote for another candidate, many Wallace supporters 
may simply have stayed home. 
The evidence supported the first hypothesis-that Wallace was hurt 
by defections to other candidates for strategic reasons. I found that 42 
percent of the voters whose first preference was Wallace, as indicated 
by the familiar "feeling thermometer" measures, believed that he had no 
chance of winning. Those who believed he could win showed a sig- 
nificantly higher rate of loyalty-88 percent to 67 percent. If the doubt- 
ers had shown the same degree of loyalty, Wallace would have raised 
his share of the vote from 13.5 percent to 14.7 percent. There was far 
less support for the second hypotheses-that Wallace's poor chances 
discouraged some of his supporters from going to the polls. I found 
that 71 percent of the Wallace supporters who believed he could win 
voted, but so did 66 percent of those who believed he could not. Losses 
due to strategic defections or abstention, then, amounted to around 12 
percent of his total vote. 
Two major reasons probably mitigated against an even more serious 
erosion of support. First, like almost every other third party challenger 
in this century, Wallace entertained noreal hope of winning the election. 
Rather, he sought o deadlock the electoral college and thus throw the 
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election to the House of Representatives. There he might have traded 
votes for certain policies, such as a ban on busing or a slow-down in 
enforcing civil rights legislation. Second, a vote for Wallace was a pro- 
test vote. Wallace did not exhort his followers to elect him president, 
but rather to "Send a Message." And a vote for Wallace was often a 
protest against the offerings of the two established parties. To the ex- 
tent that his supporters agreed with him-that there was not a dime's 
worth of difference b tween the Democrats and Republicans-they were 
unlikely to defect o either Nixon or Humphrey. 
However, even small shifts in the distribution fvotes can be crucial 
in presidential elections. Nixon's margin in popular votes, after all, was 
exceedingly small. And the operation of the electoral college makes small 
shifts even more crucial. Strom Thurmond and the Dixiecrats won only 
2.4 percent of the popular vote in 1948, but that yielded 39 electoral 
votes. And the 0.9 percent of total of the national vote won by Eugene 
McCarthy in 1976 is no measure of his impact, especially upon the 
Democratic candidate, Jimmy Carter.6 
III. Determination fthe Condorcet Winner 
Another point of interest iswhether or not Nixon, the plurality winner 
under the present "one vote only" system, was also the Condorcet win- 
ner. To answer this question it is necessary to estimate the outcomes of 
the three hypothetical pairwise contests between Nixon, Humphrey, and 
Wallace. 
In each hypothetical contest he candidates were first assigned the 
votes of those respondents who reported voting for them in the actual 
election. The votes of respondents who reported voting for the candi- 
date not included in the particular pairwise contests were assigned to 
the two other candidates in accordance with the preference they in- 
dicated on the "feeling thermometer" measures. (Ties were divided 
evenly between the candidates involved.) The results are shown in 
Table I. 
As Table I indicates, Nixon was the Condorcet winner; he would 
have won a hypothetical pairwise contest with Humphrey by about 7 
percentage points, and both he and Humphrey would have far outdis- 
6. Although McCarthy had no chance of winning, pre-election polls indicated 
that nearly all his support was drawn from Carter. And while McCarthy garnered 
only about 1 percent of the national vote, his candidacy very likely cost Carter 
four states. Furthermore, McCarthy's challenge may have forced Carter to tack 
farther to the liberal side on many issues and thus to lose many more conserva- 
tive voters to Ford. 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.115 on Mon, 22 Feb 2016 22:35:34 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
174 Research Notes 
Table I Results of Hypothetical 
Pairwise Contests Between 
Nixon, Humphrey, and 
Wallace 
N % 
Humphrey 786 75.7 
Wallace 252 24.3 
Nixon 846 81.5 
Wallace 192 18.5 
Nixon 554 53.4 
Humphrey 484 46.6 
tanced Wallace.7 However, in the actual three-way contest he single 
vote, plurality method came within 1 percent of not selecting the Con- 
dorcet winner. Nixon's clear victories in the pairwise contests indicate 
that he was the second choice of many voters, but this was of little help 
in an election in which voters could register only one preference. Ap- 
parently Nixon, not Wallace, was hurt most by the "one vote only" 
method of voting. Nixon, then, would have fared better, as I will show, 
under a system in which voters could cast more than a single vote- 
namely, approval voting. 
IV. Approval Voting 
Voting behavior and feeling thermometer ratings of the candidates were 
again used to estimate what the 1968 totals would have been under the 
approval voting system. A comprehensive set of rules was formulated to
assign approval votes to the candidates. As in the previous analysis, the 
candidates were always assigned the votes of respondents who reported 
having voted for them in the actual election. 
In nearly 90 percent of the cases, respondents voted for the candidate 
whom they had rated highest on the feeling thermometer. This high de- 
gree of correspondence between thermometer ratings and vote choice 
7. As a result of sophisticated voting, Wallace's vote totals in the hypothetical 
pairwise contests with Nixon and Humphrey were probably slightly reduced, and 
Nixon's and Humphrey's totals slightly exaggerated. The effect on the outcomes is, 
of course, negligible. Secondly, the more sophisticated Wallace supporters were 
somewhat more likely to vote for Nixon than for Humphrey, but the sample is 
too small to be of great importance. This paper shows, however, that Nixon was 
hurt by the present "one vote only" system, even though he may have benefited 
marginally from the support of sophisticated Wallacites. 
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indicates that the ratings are a good basis for judging "vote intention" in
this hypothetical election. The major decision, then, was whether or not 
to assign an approval vote to the second choice. Fortunately, the ques- 
tion wording of the feeling thermometer items strongly suggested that 
the 50th degree should be the cutting point in assigning approval votes; 
if respondents approved of a candidate, they were to rate him above 50; 
if they were unfavorable, the rating was to be below 50. Thus when their 
second choice was greater than 50 and their third choice was not, an 
approval vote was assigned to their second choice. But if their first 
choice was rated above 50 and their second choice was below 50, their 
second choice was not awarded an approval vote. 
When all three ratings were above 50 or below 50, this method ob- 
viously could not use the 50th degree as a cutting point. When all three 
were below 50, an approval vote was assigned only to the respondent's 
first choice; if they were unfavorably disposed toward their first choice, 
they were probably choosing the least of three vils. When all three were 
above 50, the relative size of the intervals between the ratings deter- 
mined whether or not an approval vote was assigned to the second 
choice. Thus, if a respondent's second choice was rated closer to his 
first choice than to his third choice, an approval vote was assigned to 
his second choice; otherwise, no approval vote was awarded. In a few 
cases, respondents voted for the candidate whom they had ranked second 
on the feeling thermometers. Here an approval vote was also assigned to 
the candidate whom they had ranked first. 
A summary of these rules is in Table II below. The preference order 
of A, B, C, where A is most preferred and C is the least preferred, is 
based upon the thermometer ratings of the candidates. The letters are 
thus not symbols for particular candidates. A bar over a letter indicates 
a thermometer rating greater than 50. These rules cover virtually all 
cases in the sample. 
Table III compares totals of the approval vote estimated according to 
these rules and the reported voting behavior of the respondents in the 
actual election. 
Under approval voting, Nixon, the Condorcet winner, would have 
won by a comfortable margin. While Nixon received 58 percent more 
votes under approval voting than under single plurality, Humphrey in- 
creased his total by only 43 percent, and thus would have lost ground 
to Nixon. Table III indicates that Wallace also would have made a more 
impressive showing under approval voting. He, too, would have gar- 
nered 58 percent more votes in the hypothetical approval voting contest 
than he did in the actual election. 
The distribution f the estimated approval voting figures illustrates 
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Table II Assignment of Approval Votes 
ACTUAL VOTE PREFERENCE ORDER APPROVAL VOTES 
A A, B, C A 
A X,B, c A 
A A, B, C A, B 
A A, B, C, (AB >BC) A 
A A, B, C (AB < BC) A, B 
B A, B, C A, B 
B A,B,C A,B 
B A, B, C A, B 
B X, B, C A, B 
Table III Comparison of Reported Voting Behavior and Estimates of 
Approval Votes 
REPORTED VOTING BEHAVIOR ESTIMATED APPROVAL VOTES 
N % N % 
Nixon 458 44.1 725 69.8 
Humphrey 440 42.3 631 60.8 
Wallace 140 13.5 221 21.3 
the basis of Nixon's success in the hypothetical election. As Table Iv 
indicates, roughly the same proportion of each candidate's supporters 
would have cast approval votes for other candidates as well. But while 
Humphrey voters gave almost all their additional approval votes to 
Nixon, Nixon voters did not fully reciprocate; they gave a substantially 
larger share of their approval votes to Wallace. Furthermore, Wallace 
supporters would have cast more than twice as many approval votes for 
Nixon than for Humphrey. The distribution fpreferences, then, would 
clearly have favored Nixon in an election held under approval voting. 
According to the rules outlined earlier, a large share of both Wallace 
and Humphrey supporters would also have voted for Nixon as an ac- 
ceptable second choice. 
One potential problem with the estimate of approval vote totals results 
from the timing of the feeling thermometer measure, which was adminis- 
tered during the period immediately following the election. Apparently, 
the public increases its support for the winning presidential candidate 
upon his election, a phenomenon known as the "fait accompli" effect.8 
8. S. J. Korchin, "Restructuration of Attitude following a National Election: 
the Fait accompli Effect," American Psychologist 3 (1948): 272; I. H. Paul, "Im- 
pressions, of Personality, Authoritarianism, and the Fait-accompli Effect," Journal 
of Abnormal and Social Psychology 53 (1956): 338-344. 
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Table IV Sources of Approval Votes 
FROM NIXON FROM HUMPHREY FROM WALLACE 
RECEIVED BY VOTERS VOTERS VOTERS 
Nixon 89.9% 70.6% 
(214) (53) 
Humphrey 74.8% -29.4% 
(169) (22) 
Wallace 25.2% 10.1% 
(57) (24) 
100% 100% 100% 
(226) (238) (75) 
Such an effect would, of course, bias the results in Nixon's favor. 
Fortunately, this is probably only half the story, for some voters may 
also view the losing candidate more favorably after the election.9 The 
reason for a positive re-evaluation of the candidates probably is the 
more tolerant appraisal of the opposing candidate once the rough-and- 
tumble of the campaign is over. Secondly, the fait accompli effect does 
not occur automatically after every election. A comparison of pre-election 
and post-election feeling thermometer ratings of the candidates in the 
1972 election shows that, if anything, voters viewed both Nixon and 
McGovern less favorably after the balloting.10 Thus the fait accompli 
effect, if it in fact occurred in 1968, may have slightly inflated approval 
voting estimates of all candidates, but it is doubtful that. it seriously 
biased them in Nixon's favor. 
A more important problem is that the assignment rules assume that 
all voters were voting sincerely; that their votes were governed solely by 
their relative valuations of the candidates and were totally free of any 
strategic considerations. As Brams points out, under an approval voting 
system voters can make their votes more effective by distinguishing be- 
tween candidates who are likely to win and those who have little chance 
of winning." Thus the estimates fail to take into account a central fea- 
9. B. H. Raven and P. S. Gallo, "The Effects of Nominating Conventions, Elec- 
tions, and Reference Group Identification upon the Perception of Political Lead- 
ers," Human Relations 18 (1965): 217-229; D. O. Sears and J. L. Freedman, 
"Organizational Judgemental Modes of Cognitive Conflict Resolution," American 
Psychologist 16 (1961): 407. 
10. While the ratings McGovern and Nixon supporters gave their man after the 
election were virtually identical to their pre-election ratings, both groups lowered 
their average ratings of the opposition candidate by about 4 degrees. 
11. Brams, "One Man, N Votes," p. 15. 
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ture of the 1968 campaign-that only Humphrey and Nixon had a rea- 
sonable chance of winning. Pre-election polls made this perfectly clear. 
Under approval voting, then, voters would presumably adopt the fol- 
lowing strategies to make their vote(s) more effective: 
1. Those favoring Nixon would never cast an approval vote for 
Humphrey, but would cast an approval vote for Wallace if they 
approved of him. 
2. Those favoring Humphrey would never cast an approval vote 
for Nixon, but would cast an approval vote for Wallace if they 
approved of him. 
3. Those favoring Wallace would cast an approval vote for him 
and would also cast an approval vote for their preference between 
Nixon and Humphrey. 
In short, only the following strategies would be admissible (a slash 
divides those candidates receiving approval votes and those not): N/H 
W; N/W H; N W/H; H/N W; H/W N; H W/N; W H/N; W N/H. 
In effect a poll indicating that Wallace had no chance of winning 
would, under approval voting, turn the election into two elections: first, 
a pairwise contest between Nixon and Humphrey, wherein all voters 
would choose one or the other; second, a kind of referendum for Wal- 
lace, who would receive approval votes from voters supporting him even 
though e could not win the election. 
In this manner, voters were "forced" to be rational. More specifically, 
Nixon and Humphrey voters were assumed to cast an approval vote for 
their actual vote choice and for Wallace if he was their second choice 
and his thermometer rating exceeded 50. Wallace voters were constrained 
to cast an approval vote for Wallace and a vote for either Nixon or Hum- 
phrey, depending on which of the two had the higher thermometer rating. 
This is true regardless of how low their ratings of Nixon and/or Hum- 
phrey might be-Wallace voters had to choose between the two evils 
that had a chance of winning. (Eighteen Wallace voters gave identical 
ratings to Nixon and Humphrey, so it was assumed that they would split 
evenly between them-nine to each candidate.) New estimates of ap- 
proval vote totals, which account for the impact of pre-election polls 
showing that Wallace could not win, are given in Table v. 
We see that Nixon, the Condorcet winner, would have won anyway 
despite the voters' knowledge that Wallace did not have a chance. This 
knowledge did, however, stop rational voters supporting Humphrey 
from casting approval votes for Nixon, and vice versa. Because voters 
continued to vote sincerely in regard to Wallace, his total was un- 
changed. The end effect of strategic voting in this case was thus to lower 
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Table V Comparison of Sincere and Strategic Approval 
Voting 
SINCERE VOTING* STRATEGIC VOTING 
N % N % 
Nixon 725 69.8 554 53.4 
Humphrey 631 60.8 484 46.6 
Wallace 221 21.3 221 21.3 
* From Table III. 
Nixon's and Humphrey's totals and to reduce Nixon's margin over Hum- 
phrey. Again, Wallace voters would have greatly aided Nixon: they 
would have given him 118 percent more approval votes than Humhprey 
(96 to 44 in the sample). 
Assuming that all voters were voting strategically, Nixon's and Hum- 
phrey's totals were identical to their totals in the hypothetical pairwise 
contest. The reason is that the two contests are identical-Nixon and 
Humphrey voters continued to vote for their favorite, while Wallace 
voters opted for their second choice. But as indicated earlier, approval 
voting would incorporate another '"election" into the election-the de 
facto referendum onWallace. By allowing voters to cast only one vote, 
the present system presented Wallace voters with the dilemma of having 
to decide which "election" to participate in, that is, whether to vote 
sincerely or strategically. Under approval voting, Wallace voters could 
have voted both for their favorite and for their second choice without 
feeling forced to vote contrary to their true preferences if they wanted 
their vote to count. 
To be sure, both sets of aproval vote totals-the first assuming 
wholly sincere voting, the second wholly strategic voting-are only rea- 
sonable estimates. Had there actually been approval voting in 1968, 
voters would probably have exhibited some mixture of sincere and so- 
phisticated voting, and thus the two sets of estimates for Humphrey and 
Nixon probably indicate the upper and lower limits of what they would 
actually have received. But whichever set is more accurate, the upshot 
of the figures remains the same-Nixon clearly would have been the 
winner. 
V. The Political Consequences of Approval Voting 
Although the hypothetical contest presented here refers only to one 
particular multi-candidate el ction, it is sufficiently compelling to help 
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us anticipate what the political consequences of approval voting would 
be in general. 
First, this system would be far more likely to elect Condorcet winners, 
that is, widely acceptable if not fervently loved (or hated) individuals. 
Nixon, the Condorcet winner, barely succeeded in 1968 but probably 
would have won easily under approval voting. This advantage would 
make approval voting especially desirable for presidential primaries. If 
the two major parties are truly interested innominating candidates who 
appeal to a broad spectrum of voters, approval voting would serve well. 
As of now, candidates often win in primaries with a plurality of less than 
30 percent as they did in the Democratic primaries in New Hampshire 
and Massachusetts in 1976. The present method is ill-suited to produce 
widely acceptable nominees. In his analysis of the impact of different 
decision rules, Joslyn found that, in fully one-third of the 1972 Demo- 
cratic primaries he investigated, the plurality winner was probably not 
the Condorcet winner.12 
However, approval voting would probably not alter the campaign 
strategies of major party candidates very greatly. Most spatial models of 
electoral competition i dicate that the best strategy for a candidate is to 
take the median position, and political pundits have long argued that 
presidential candidates must capture the "strategic center" in order to 
win. But if this is sound advice under the present system of voting, it 
would be even more so under approval voting. Nixon's strong perfor- 
mance in a hypothetical approval voting election was in large part due 
to the approval votes cast by voters whose first choice was Wallace or 
Humphrey. It seems clear that under approval voting a candidate is 
better off with lukewarm support that is widespread than with enthusias- 
tic support that is not. 
Strategic considerations might of course become more complicated if 
voters were to adopt sophisticated voting strategies. In 1968, for exam- 
ple, Humphrey supporters, if they were sophisticated, would not have 
cast an approval vote for Nixon. Nixon would then have been well-advised 
to move closer to the Wallace camp in search of appproval votes and 
write off the Humphreyites. However, many voters were truly indif- 
ferent o the choice between Nixon and Humphrey, and it is doubtful 
that purely strategic voting would occur. Thus Nixon would not have 
been able wholly to discount second choice approval votes from Hum- 
phreyites, and any significant shift oward the Wallace flank would alien- 
12. Richard A. Joslyn, "The Impact of Decision Rules in Multi-Candidate Cam- 
paigns: The Case of the 1972 Presidential Nomination," Public Choice 25 (1976): 
1-17. 
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ate some of his own supporters. Whether or not much sophisticated voting 
occurred, Nixon's best strategy would be the same as he followed in the 
actual election under the present system-staying close to the center, 
while making sure that he remained more attractive toWallace supporters 
than Humphrey. 
Many people, of course, would not welcome any reinforcement of 
the already strong centripetal pressures present in electoral politics. The 
desire not to alienate any potential source of support might further in- 
crease the already prodigious ambiguity in campaign rhetoric and further 
debase the quality of information upon which voters must rely. In this 
view, approval voting would only hinder electoral democracy by addine 
even more static to this already noisy channel of elite mass communi- 
cation. 
However, the other major feature of approval voting should allay 
these fears. For while the stabilizing, centripetal pressures of the present 
system would remain, approval voting unlike the present system, does 
not discourage more extreme or unconventional candidates. Rather, it 
allows a sort of referendum on a candidate or candidates who do not 
have a serious chance of winning. One constraint on the expression of 
dissenting or unorthodox views would thus be removed. Those who feel 
ignored by the major parties, or who can perceive no important dif- 
ferences between them, would be more likely to find a spokesman. Of 
course other powerful constraints, such as the difficulties ofobtaining 
public financing or simply getting on the ballot, would remain. And at 
least for the near future, the candidates of the two major parties would 
probably continue to be the leading favorites. A system that would allow 
voters to choose between them and also to support other candidates 
would also reflect the degree to which the major parties are addressing 
the problems that most concern the American people. 
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